Fully Proportional Representation as Resource Allocation: Approximability Results
Abstract
We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under Monroe's and Chamberlin-Courant's multiwinner voting rules, where we focus on the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters (the utilitarian case) or the (dis)satisfaction of the worst-off voter (the egalitarian case). We show good approximation algorithms for the satisfaction-based utilitarian cases, and inapproximability results for the remaining settings.
Cite
Text
Skowron et al. "Fully Proportional Representation as Resource Allocation: Approximability Results." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013.Markdown
[Skowron et al. "Fully Proportional Representation as Resource Allocation: Approximability Results." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2013/skowron2013ijcai-fully/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{skowron2013ijcai-fully,
title = {{Fully Proportional Representation as Resource Allocation: Approximability Results}},
author = {Skowron, Piotr Krzysztof and Faliszewski, Piotr and Slinko, Arkadii M.},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2013},
pages = {353-359},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2013/skowron2013ijcai-fully/}
}