ML Anthology

Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier, Toby Walsh
IJCAI 2015 pp. 164-170
/ijcai/2015/bredereck2015ijcai-parliamentary/

Abstract

We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding possible winners is NP-hard for both procedures. Whereas finding necessary winners is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.

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Cite

Text

Bredereck et al. "Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.

Markdown

[Bredereck et al. "Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2015/bredereck2015ijcai-parliamentary/)

BibTeX

@inproceedings{bredereck2015ijcai-parliamentary,
  title     = {{Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty}},
  author    = {Bredereck, Robert and Chen, Jiehua and Niedermeier, Rolf and Walsh, Toby},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2015},
  pages     = {164-170},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2015/bredereck2015ijcai-parliamentary/}
}