Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games
Abstract
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators — voters who could change the election outcome in their favor by unilaterally modifying their vote. In this paper, we ask what happens if a given profile admits several such voters. We model strategic interactions among Gibbard–Satterthwaite manipulators as a normal-form game. We classify the 2-by-2 games that can arise in this setting for two simple voting rules, namely Plurality and Borda, and study the complexity of determining whether a given manipulative vote weakly dominates truth-telling, as well as existence of Nash equilibria.
Cite
Text
Elkind et al. "Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.Markdown
[Elkind et al. "Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2015/elkind2015ijcai-gibbard/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{elkind2015ijcai-gibbard,
title = {{Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games}},
author = {Elkind, Edith and Grandi, Umberto and Rossi, Francesca and Slinko, Arkadii},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2015},
pages = {533-539},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2015/elkind2015ijcai-gibbard/}
}