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Equilibrium Refinement Through Negotiation in Binary Voting

Umberto Grandi, Davide Grossi, Paolo Turrini
IJCAI 2015 pp. 540-546
/ijcai/2015/grandi2015ijcai-equilibrium/

Abstract

We study voting games on binary issues, where voters might hold an objective over some issues at stake, while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones, and can influence one another's voting decision before the vote takes place. We analyse voters' rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed as an effect of the pre-vote phase.

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Text

Grandi et al. "Equilibrium Refinement Through Negotiation in Binary Voting." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.

Markdown

[Grandi et al. "Equilibrium Refinement Through Negotiation in Binary Voting." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2015/grandi2015ijcai-equilibrium/)

BibTeX

@inproceedings{grandi2015ijcai-equilibrium,
  title     = {{Equilibrium Refinement Through Negotiation in Binary Voting}},
  author    = {Grandi, Umberto and Grossi, Davide and Turrini, Paolo},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2015},
  pages     = {540-546},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2015/grandi2015ijcai-equilibrium/}
}