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Truthfulness of a Proportional Sharing Mechanism in Resource Exchange

Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi, Xiang Yan
IJCAI 2016 pp. 187-193
/ijcai/2016/cheng2016ijcai-truthfulness/

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the popular proportional sharing mechanism and discuss the incentives and opportunities of an agent to lie for personal gains in resource exchange game. The main result is a proof that an agent manipulating the proportional sharing mechanism by misreporting its resource amount will not benefit its own utility eventually. This result establishes a strategic stability property of the resource exchange protocol. We further illustrate and confirm the result via network examples. PDF

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Cite

Text

Cheng et al. "Truthfulness of a Proportional Sharing Mechanism in Resource Exchange." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016.

Markdown

[Cheng et al. "Truthfulness of a Proportional Sharing Mechanism in Resource Exchange." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2016/cheng2016ijcai-truthfulness/)

BibTeX

@inproceedings{cheng2016ijcai-truthfulness,
  title     = {{Truthfulness of a Proportional Sharing Mechanism in Resource Exchange}},
  author    = {Cheng, Yukun and Deng, Xiaotie and Qi, Qi and Yan, Xiang},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2016},
  pages     = {187-193},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2016/cheng2016ijcai-truthfulness/}
}