Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth
Abstract
We study envy-free cake cutting with strategic agents, where each agent may manipulate his private information in order to receive a better allocation. We focus on piecewise constant utility functions and consider two scenarios: the general setting without any restriction on the allocations and the restricted setting where each agent has to receive a connected piece. We show that no deterministic truthful envy-free mechanism exists in the connected piece scenario, and the same impossibility result for the general setting with some additional mild assumptions on the allocations. Finally, we study a large market model where the economy is replicated and demonstrate that truth-telling converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Cite
Text
Bei et al. "Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2017/507Markdown
[Bei et al. "Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2017/bei2017ijcai-cake/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2017/507BibTeX
@inproceedings{bei2017ijcai-cake,
title = {{Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth}},
author = {Bei, Xiaohui and Chen, Ning and Huzhang, Guangda and Tao, Biaoshuai and Wu, Jiajun},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2017},
pages = {3625-3631},
doi = {10.24963/IJCAI.2017/507},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2017/bei2017ijcai-cake/}
}