Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Lexicographic Preferences

Abstract

We study concurrent games with finite-memory strategies where players are given a Buchi and a mean-payoff objective, which are related by a lexicographic order: a player first prefers to satisfy its Buchi objective, and then prefers to minimise costs, which are given by a mean-payoff function. In particular, we show that deciding the existence of a strict Nash equilibrium in such games is decidable, even if players' deviations are implemented as infinite memory strategies.

Cite

Text

Gutierrez et al. "Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Lexicographic Preferences." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2017/148

Markdown

[Gutierrez et al. "Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Lexicographic Preferences." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2017/gutierrez2017ijcai-nash/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2017/148

BibTeX

@inproceedings{gutierrez2017ijcai-nash,
  title     = {{Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Lexicographic Preferences}},
  author    = {Gutierrez, Julian and Murano, Aniello and Perelli, Giuseppe and Rubin, Sasha and Wooldridge, Michael J.},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2017},
  pages     = {1067-1073},
  doi       = {10.24963/IJCAI.2017/148},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2017/gutierrez2017ijcai-nash/}
}