Egalitarian Committee Scoring Rules

Haris Aziz, Piotr Faliszewski, Bernard Grofman, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon

IJCAI 2018 pp. 56-62

doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2018/8 /ijcai/2018/aziz2018ijcai-egalitarian/

Abstract

We introduce and study the class of egalitarian variants of committee scoring rules, where instead of summing up the scores that voters assign to committees---as is done in the utilitarian variants---the score of a committee is taken to be the lowest score assigned to it by any voter. We focus on five rules, which are egalitarian analogues of SNTV, the k-Borda rule, the Chamberlin--Courant rule, the Bloc rule, and the Pessimist rule. We establish their computational complexity, provide their initial axiomatic study, and perform experiments to represent the action of these rules graphically.

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Text

Aziz et al. "Egalitarian Committee Scoring Rules." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2018/8

Markdown

[Aziz et al. "Egalitarian Committee Scoring Rules." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2018/aziz2018ijcai-egalitarian/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2018/8

BibTeX

@inproceedings{aziz2018ijcai-egalitarian,
  title     = {{Egalitarian Committee Scoring Rules}},
  author    = {Aziz, Haris and Faliszewski, Piotr and Grofman, Bernard and Slinko, Arkadii and Talmon, Nimrod},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2018},
  pages     = {56-62},
  doi       = {10.24963/IJCAI.2018/8},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2018/aziz2018ijcai-egalitarian/}
}