Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
Abstract
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in [Ferraioli and Ventre, 2017], is to find a small set (possibly, the smallest) of conditions allowing to implement an OSP mechanism. To this aim, we define a model of probabilistic verification wherein agents are caught misbehaving with a certain probability, and show how OSP mechanisms can implement every social choice function at the cost of either imposing very large fines or verifying a linear number of agents.
Cite
Text
Ferraioli and Ventre. "Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2018/33Markdown
[Ferraioli and Ventre. "Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2018/ferraioli2018ijcai-probabilistic/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2018/33BibTeX
@inproceedings{ferraioli2018ijcai-probabilistic,
title = {{Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms}},
author = {Ferraioli, Diodato and Ventre, Carmine},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2018},
pages = {240-246},
doi = {10.24963/IJCAI.2018/33},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2018/ferraioli2018ijcai-probabilistic/}
}