Ceteris Paribus Majority for Social Ranking
Abstract
We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution inspired from the classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an example.
Cite
Text
Haret et al. "Ceteris Paribus Majority for Social Ranking." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2018/42Markdown
[Haret et al. "Ceteris Paribus Majority for Social Ranking." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2018/haret2018ijcai-ceteris/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2018/42BibTeX
@inproceedings{haret2018ijcai-ceteris,
title = {{Ceteris Paribus Majority for Social Ranking}},
author = {Haret, Adrian and Khani, Hossein and Moretti, Stefano and Öztürk, Meltem},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2018},
pages = {303-309},
doi = {10.24963/IJCAI.2018/42},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2018/haret2018ijcai-ceteris/}
}