Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules and Strategic Voting
Abstract
We investigate the possibility of strategic voting in approval-based multiwinner rules. In particular, we define three axiomatic properties that guarantee resilience to certain forms of strategic voting: independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), monotonicity, and SD-strategyproofness. In this paper, we systematically analyze multiwinner rules based on these axioms and provide a fine-grained picture of their resilience to strategic voting. Both our axiomatic and experimental analysis show that approval-based multiwinner rules are generally very susceptible to strategic voting---with one exception: multiwinner approval voting.
Cite
Text
Lackner and Skowron. "Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules and Strategic Voting." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2018/47Markdown
[Lackner and Skowron. "Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules and Strategic Voting." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2018/lackner2018ijcai-approval/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2018/47BibTeX
@inproceedings{lackner2018ijcai-approval,
title = {{Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules and Strategic Voting}},
author = {Lackner, Martin and Skowron, Piotr},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2018},
pages = {340-346},
doi = {10.24963/IJCAI.2018/47},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2018/lackner2018ijcai-approval/}
}