Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods
Abstract
Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. However, existing mechanisms are either not truthful, do not guarantee an asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, rely on a prior on the traders' valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single type of good. We extend the random-sampling technique used in earlier works to multi-good markets where traders have gross-substitute valuations. We show a prior free, truthful and strongly-budget-balanced mechanism which guarantees near-optimal gain from trade when the market sizes of all goods grow to infinity at a similar rate.
Cite
Text
Segal-Halevi et al. "Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2018/68Markdown
[Segal-Halevi et al. "Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2018/segalhalevi2018ijcai-double/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2018/68BibTeX
@inproceedings{segalhalevi2018ijcai-double,
title = {{Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods}},
author = {Segal-Halevi, Erel and Hassidim, Avinatan and Aumann, Yonatan},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2018},
pages = {489-497},
doi = {10.24963/IJCAI.2018/68},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2018/segalhalevi2018ijcai-double/}
}