Multi-Population Congestion Games with Incomplete Information
Abstract
Congestion games have many important applications to systems where only limited knowledge may be available to players. Here we study traffic networks with multiple origin-destination pairs, relaxing the simplifying assumption of agents having complete knowledge of the network structure. We identify a ubiquitous class of networks, i.e., rings, for which we can safely increase the agents’ knowledge without affecting their own overall performance - known as immunity to Informational Braess’ Paradox - closing a gap in the literature. By extension of this performance measure to include the welfare of all agents, i.e., minimisation of social cost, we show that IBP is a widespread phenomenon and no network is immune to it.
Cite
Text
Roman and Turrini. "Multi-Population Congestion Games with Incomplete Information." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2019/80Markdown
[Roman and Turrini. "Multi-Population Congestion Games with Incomplete Information." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2019/roman2019ijcai-multi/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2019/80BibTeX
@inproceedings{roman2019ijcai-multi,
title = {{Multi-Population Congestion Games with Incomplete Information}},
author = {Roman, Charlotte and Turrini, Paolo},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2019},
pages = {565-571},
doi = {10.24963/IJCAI.2019/80},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2019/roman2019ijcai-multi/}
}