Aggregating Incomplete Pairwise Preferences by Weight
Abstract
We develop a model for the aggregation of preferences that do not need to be either complete or transitive. Our focus is on the normative characterisation of aggregation rules under which each agent has a weight that depends only on the size of her ballot, i.e., on the number of pairs of alternatives for which she chooses to report a relative ranking. We show that for rules that satisfy a restricted form of majoritarianism these weights in fact must be constant, while for rules that are invariant under agents with compatible preferences forming pre-election pacts it must be the case that an agent's weight is inversely proportional to the size of her ballot.
Cite
Text
Terzopoulou and Endriss. "Aggregating Incomplete Pairwise Preferences by Weight." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2019/84Markdown
[Terzopoulou and Endriss. "Aggregating Incomplete Pairwise Preferences by Weight." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2019/terzopoulou2019ijcai-aggregating/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2019/84BibTeX
@inproceedings{terzopoulou2019ijcai-aggregating,
title = {{Aggregating Incomplete Pairwise Preferences by Weight}},
author = {Terzopoulou, Zoi and Endriss, Ulle},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2019},
pages = {595-601},
doi = {10.24963/IJCAI.2019/84},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2019/terzopoulou2019ijcai-aggregating/}
}