Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections

Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Michal Furdyna, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Martin Lackner

IJCAI 2020 pp. 103-109

doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2020/15 /ijcai/2020/bredereck2020ijcai-strategic/

Abstract

In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. We study the complexity of the following bribery-style problem: Given the distribution of votes among the parties, what is the smallest number of voters that need to be convinced to vote for our party, so that it gets a desired number of seats. We also run extensive experiments on real-world election data and measure the effectiveness of our method.

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Text

Bredereck et al. "Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2020/15

Markdown

[Bredereck et al. "Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2020/bredereck2020ijcai-strategic/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2020/15

BibTeX

@inproceedings{bredereck2020ijcai-strategic,
  title     = {{Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections}},
  author    = {Bredereck, Robert and Faliszewski, Piotr and Furdyna, Michal and Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej and Lackner, Martin},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year      = {2020},
  pages     = {103-109},
  doi       = {10.24963/IJCAI.2020/15},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2020/bredereck2020ijcai-strategic/}
}