The Complexity of Election Problems with Group-Separable Preferences
Abstract
We analyze the complexity of several NP-hard election-related problems under the assumptions that the voters have group-separable preferences. We show that under this assumption our problems typically remain NP-hard, but we provide more efficient algorithms if additionally the clone decomposition tree is of moderate height.
Cite
Text
Faliszewski et al. "The Complexity of Election Problems with Group-Separable Preferences." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2020/29Markdown
[Faliszewski et al. "The Complexity of Election Problems with Group-Separable Preferences." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2020/faliszewski2020ijcai-complexity/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2020/29BibTeX
@inproceedings{faliszewski2020ijcai-complexity,
title = {{The Complexity of Election Problems with Group-Separable Preferences}},
author = {Faliszewski, Piotr and Karpov, Alexander and Obraztsova, Svetlana},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2020},
pages = {203-209},
doi = {10.24963/IJCAI.2020/29},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2020/faliszewski2020ijcai-complexity/}
}