Reasoning About Agents That May Know Other Agents' Strategies
Abstract
We study the semantics of knowledge in strategic reasoning. Most existing works either implicitly assume that agents do not know one another’s strategies, or that all strategies are known to all; and some works present inconsistent mixes of both features. We put forward a novel semantics for Strategy Logic with Knowledge that cleanly models whose strategies each agent knows. We study how adopting this semantics impacts agents’ knowledge and strategic ability, as well as the complexity of the model-checking problem.
Cite
Text
Belardinelli et al. "Reasoning About Agents That May Know Other Agents' Strategies." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2021/246Markdown
[Belardinelli et al. "Reasoning About Agents That May Know Other Agents' Strategies." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2021/belardinelli2021ijcai-reasoning/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2021/246BibTeX
@inproceedings{belardinelli2021ijcai-reasoning,
title = {{Reasoning About Agents That May Know Other Agents' Strategies}},
author = {Belardinelli, Francesco and Knight, Sophia and Lomuscio, Alessio and Maubert, Bastien and Murano, Aniello and Rubin, Sasha},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2021},
pages = {1787-1793},
doi = {10.24963/IJCAI.2021/246},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2021/belardinelli2021ijcai-reasoning/}
}