Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information
Abstract
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her k most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We characterize the amount of preference information that must be elicited in order to satisfy envy-freeness up to one good and approximate maximin share guarantee, two widely studied fairness notions. We also analyze the multiplicative loss in social welfare incurred due to the lack of full information with and without fairness requirements.
Cite
Text
Halpern and Shah. "Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2021/32Markdown
[Halpern and Shah. "Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2021/halpern2021ijcai-fair/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2021/32BibTeX
@inproceedings{halpern2021ijcai-fair,
title = {{Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information}},
author = {Halpern, Daniel and Shah, Nisarg},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2021},
pages = {224-230},
doi = {10.24963/IJCAI.2021/32},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2021/halpern2021ijcai-fair/}
}