The Limits of Morality in Strategic Games
Abstract
An agent, or a coalition of agents, is blameable for an outcome if she had a strategy to prevent it. In this paper we introduce a notion of limited blameworthiness, with a constraint on the amount of sacrifice required to prevent the outcome. The main technical contribution is a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about limited blameworthiness in the strategic game setting.
Cite
Text
Cao and Naumov. "The Limits of Morality in Strategic Games." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022. doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2022/355Markdown
[Cao and Naumov. "The Limits of Morality in Strategic Games." International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022.](https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2022/cao2022ijcai-limits/) doi:10.24963/IJCAI.2022/355BibTeX
@inproceedings{cao2022ijcai-limits,
title = {{The Limits of Morality in Strategic Games}},
author = {Cao, Rui and Naumov, Pavel},
booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2022},
pages = {2561-2567},
doi = {10.24963/IJCAI.2022/355},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/ijcai/2022/cao2022ijcai-limits/}
}