Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections

Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Aviv Zohar

JAIR 2008 pp. 149-178

doi:10.1613/JAIR.2566 /jair/2008/meir2008jair-complexity/

Abstract

Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multiwinner voting systems, under different formulations of the strategic agent's goal.

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Text

Meir et al. "Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2008. doi:10.1613/JAIR.2566

Markdown

[Meir et al. "Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2008.](https://mlanthology.org/jair/2008/meir2008jair-complexity/) doi:10.1613/JAIR.2566

BibTeX

@article{meir2008jair-complexity,
  title     = {{Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections}},
  author    = {Meir, Reshef and Procaccia, Ariel D. and Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. and Zohar, Aviv},
  journal   = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {149-178},
  doi       = {10.1613/JAIR.2566},
  volume    = {33},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/jair/2008/meir2008jair-complexity/}
}