A Procedural Characterization of Solution Concepts in Games
Abstract
We show how game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of a knowledge-based program with counterfactual semantics. In a precise sense, this program can be viewed as providing a procedural characterization of rationality.
Cite
Text
Halpern and Moses. "A Procedural Characterization of Solution Concepts in Games." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2014. doi:10.1613/JAIR.4220Markdown
[Halpern and Moses. "A Procedural Characterization of Solution Concepts in Games." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2014.](https://mlanthology.org/jair/2014/halpern2014jair-procedural/) doi:10.1613/JAIR.4220BibTeX
@article{halpern2014jair-procedural,
title = {{A Procedural Characterization of Solution Concepts in Games}},
author = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Moses, Yoram},
journal = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
year = {2014},
pages = {143-170},
doi = {10.1613/JAIR.4220},
volume = {49},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/jair/2014/halpern2014jair-procedural/}
}