A Procedural Characterization of Solution Concepts in Games

Abstract

We show how game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of a knowledge-based program with counterfactual semantics. In a precise sense, this program can be viewed as providing a procedural characterization of rationality.

Cite

Text

Halpern and Moses. "A Procedural Characterization of Solution Concepts in Games." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2014. doi:10.1613/JAIR.4220

Markdown

[Halpern and Moses. "A Procedural Characterization of Solution Concepts in Games." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2014.](https://mlanthology.org/jair/2014/halpern2014jair-procedural/) doi:10.1613/JAIR.4220

BibTeX

@article{halpern2014jair-procedural,
  title     = {{A Procedural Characterization of Solution Concepts in Games}},
  author    = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Moses, Yoram},
  journal   = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
  year      = {2014},
  pages     = {143-170},
  doi       = {10.1613/JAIR.4220},
  volume    = {49},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/jair/2014/halpern2014jair-procedural/}
}