Weighted Electoral Control

Abstract

Although manipulation and bribery have been extensively studied under weighted voting, there has been almost no work done on election control under weighted voting. This is unfortunate, since weighted voting appears in many important natural settings. In this paper, we study the complexity of controlling the outcome of weighted elections through adding and deleting voters. We obtain polynomial-time algorithms, NP-completeness results, and for many NP-complete cases, approximation algorithms. Our work shows that for quite a few important cases, either polynomial-time exact algorithms or polynomial-time approximation algorithms exist.

Cite

Text

Faliszewski et al. "Weighted Electoral Control." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2015. doi:10.1613/JAIR.4621

Markdown

[Faliszewski et al. "Weighted Electoral Control." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2015.](https://mlanthology.org/jair/2015/faliszewski2015jair-weighted/) doi:10.1613/JAIR.4621

BibTeX

@article{faliszewski2015jair-weighted,
  title     = {{Weighted Electoral Control}},
  author    = {Faliszewski, Piotr and Hemaspaandra, Edith and Hemaspaandra, Lane A.},
  journal   = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
  year      = {2015},
  pages     = {507-542},
  doi       = {10.1613/JAIR.4621},
  volume    = {52},
  url       = {https://mlanthology.org/jair/2015/faliszewski2015jair-weighted/}
}