Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds
Abstract
We propose a new representation setting for hedonic games, where each agent partitions the set of other agents into friends, enemies, and neutral agents, with friends and enemies being ranked. Under the assumption that preferences are monotonic (respectively, antimonotonic) with respect to the addition of friends (respectively, enemies), we propose a bipolar extension of the responsive extension principle, and use this principle to derive the (partial) preferences of agents over coalitions. Then, for a number of solution concepts, we characterize partitions that necessarily or possibly satisfy them, and we study the related problems in terms of their complexity.
Cite
Text
Kerkmann et al. "Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2020. doi:10.1613/JAIR.1.11531Markdown
[Kerkmann et al. "Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2020.](https://mlanthology.org/jair/2020/kerkmann2020jair-hedonic/) doi:10.1613/JAIR.1.11531BibTeX
@article{kerkmann2020jair-hedonic,
title = {{Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds}},
author = {Kerkmann, Anna Maria and Lang, Jérôme and Rey, Anja and Rothe, Jörg and Schadrack, Hilmar and Schend, Lena},
journal = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
year = {2020},
pages = {705-756},
doi = {10.1613/JAIR.1.11531},
volume = {67},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/jair/2020/kerkmann2020jair-hedonic/}
}