Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting
Abstract
We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices as possible, provided that their projects get selected and the prices are not below the minimum costs of their delivery. We study the existence of pure Nash equilibria (NE) in such games, focusing on the AV/Cost, Phragmen, and Method of Equal Shares rules. We also provide an experimental study of cost selection on real-life PB election data.
Cite
Text
Faliszewski et al. "Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting." Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2025.Markdown
[Faliszewski et al. "Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting." Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2025.](https://mlanthology.org/neurips/2025/faliszewski2025neurips-strategic/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{faliszewski2025neurips-strategic,
title = {{Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting}},
author = {Faliszewski, Piotr and Janeczko, Łukasz and Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej and Lisowski, Grzegorz and Skowron, Piotr and Szufa, Stanisław and Szwagierczak, Mateusz},
booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems},
year = {2025},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/neurips/2025/faliszewski2025neurips-strategic/}
}