Normalization and the Representation of Nonmonotonic Knowledge in the Theory of Evidence
Abstract
We discuss the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. We introduce a concept of monotonicity which is related to the diminution of the range between belief and plausibility. We show that the accumulation of knowledge in this framework exhibits a nonmonotonic property. We show how the belief structure can be used to represent typical or commonsense knowledge.
Cite
Text
Yager. "Normalization and the Representation of Nonmonotonic Knowledge in the Theory of Evidence." Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 1989.Markdown
[Yager. "Normalization and the Representation of Nonmonotonic Knowledge in the Theory of Evidence." Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 1989.](https://mlanthology.org/uai/1989/yager1989uai-normalization/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{yager1989uai-normalization,
title = {{Normalization and the Representation of Nonmonotonic Knowledge in the Theory of Evidence}},
author = {Yager, Ronald R.},
booktitle = {Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence},
year = {1989},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/uai/1989/yager1989uai-normalization/}
}