A Model for Non-Monotonic Reasoning Using Dempster's Rule
Abstract
Considerable attention has been given to the problem of non-monotonic reasoning in a belief function framework. Earlier work (M. Ginsberg) proposed solutions introducing meta-rules which recognized conditional independencies in a probabilistic sense. More recently an e-calculus formulation of default reasoning (J. Pearl) shows that the application of Dempster's rule to a non-monotonic situation produces erroneous results. This paper presents a new belief function interpretation of the problem which combines the rules in a way which is more compatible with probabilistic results and respects conditions of independence necessary for the application of Dempster's combination rule. A new general framework for combining conflicting evidence is also proposed in which the normalization factor becomes modified. This produces more intuitively acceptable results.
Cite
Text
McLeish. "A Model for Non-Monotonic Reasoning Using Dempster's Rule." Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 1990.Markdown
[McLeish. "A Model for Non-Monotonic Reasoning Using Dempster's Rule." Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 1990.](https://mlanthology.org/uai/1990/mcleish1990uai-model/)BibTeX
@inproceedings{mcleish1990uai-model,
title = {{A Model for Non-Monotonic Reasoning Using Dempster's Rule}},
author = {McLeish, Mary},
booktitle = {Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence},
year = {1990},
pages = {481-494},
url = {https://mlanthology.org/uai/1990/mcleish1990uai-model/}
}